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COMMENTS
THE FINE ARTS:
WHAT CONSTITUTES INFRINGMENT*
Introduction
Some 15,000 to 20,000 years ago in a dimly lit recess of a
large cave on Blackacre, X, a man of unparalleled imagination
and genius, in response to an inexplicable inspiration, grasped
a bit of prehistoric chalk and sketched upon a limestone wall the
picture of a bison. Returning from the hunt, his friends were
exultant. Something strange and new had been added to the
history of civilization. They immediately realized that X's talents should be protected, that his creativity should be encouraged, that the proper steps should be taken to insure that no
second-rate imitator drew cheap copies of X's masterpiece in
every other cave in the world, thereby decreasing the value of
Blackacre, which now possessed untold magical powers, not to
speak of its practical values. X had become the world's first artist. He had also become the recipient of the first copyright.
Without a doubt, the history of art, and of copyright law,
did not begin in this fashion, but it is true that the creators of
works of the fine arts have been honored members of society
from Magdalenian man to the present. "[W]e do know definitely
that from the earliest times until today human beings the world
over have given expression to human experience in concrete
tangible forms which we call works of art."1 Civilization has
recognized value in artistic creation-economic, political, utilitarian or aesthetic-and states have afforded it various forms of
protection. Copyright statutes relating to the fine arts can be
found in England as far back as 1735,2 and in the United States
dating from 1790. 3
*This article was awarded first prize in the 1963 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at the University of Alabama Law School, and third prize in the National
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition. It is published through the courtesy of the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1 GARDNER, ART THROUGH THE AGES 1 (1926).
2 8 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1735). "Whereas divers persons have by their own genius, industry, pains, and expense, invented and engraved, or worked in Mezzotinto or Chiaro
Oscuro, sets of historical and other prints, in hopes to have reaped the sole benefit of
their labours; and whereas print-sellers and other persons have of late, without the
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Of all the fields of creative endeavor afforded protection by
our current copyright statutes,4 none would seem to encompass
such an extensive and variegated array of items as does the category, "works of art." The Copyright Act provides that "any
person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of
this title, shall have the exclusive right: (a) To print, reprint,
publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work," 5 and this protection 6is extended to "works of art; models or designs for works of
art."

The United States Copyright Office has supplied the following description of the category: 7
Works of art (Class G).
(a) General. This class includes published or unpublished works of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as works belonging to the fine arts, such as
paintings, drawings, and sculpture.
(b) In order to be acceptable as a work of art, the work must embody
some creative authorship in its delineation or form....
(c) If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that
the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work
of art ....

The multiplicity of items which have qualified within this
definition of "works of art" was noted by Justice Douglas in a
concurring opinion in Mazer v. Stein:s
The Copyright Office has supplied us with a long list of such articles
which have been copyrighted-statuettes, book ends, clocks, lamps, door
knockers, candlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt
and pepper shakers, fish bowls, casseroles, and ash trays.

In view of the large range of objects encompassed by the
phrase "works of art," the present writer has confined his consideration to what has been referred to above as "the fine arts."
Except where otherwise noted, all cases discussed or noted have
involved drawings, paintings, engravings, sculpture, or, in a few
instances, photographs, the area of photography being increasconsent of the inventors, designers, and proprietors of such prints, frequently taken
the liberty of copying, engraving, and publishing or causing to be copied, engraved,
and published, base copies of such works, designs, and prints, to the very great
prejudice and detriment of the inventors, designers, and proprietors thereof.
3 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
4 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1958).
5 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
6 17 U.S.C. § 5 (g) (1958).
7 31 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1960)
8 347 U.S. 201, 221 (1954).
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ingly the subject of artistic endeavor in recent years. Though
works of art have always served functional purposes, at times for
good and at times for bad, they have at the same time been
cherished in and for themselvesf It is hoped that by limiting
the scope of the present inquiry, it will be possible to determine
the attitude of the courts to art qua art, and that certain unanswered problems in this area may at least be identified.
Why Protect the Artist?
The early English justices would appear to have possessed
a greater respect for and understanding of law than art, 10 and
seldom does one find an inclination to speak in terms of a work
of art as of value in itself." This is not to say that the courts
are not generous in the protection afforded, but the decisions
are more often based on injury to the reputation of the artist 2 or
13
to the commercial value of the work of art
The United States courts, while noting that there is no
standard of artistic taste, 14 have nevertheless recognized that "the
concept of beauty expressed in the materials of statuary or drawing, is the thing which is copyrighted.' ' 15 And Justice Reed,
speaking for the United States Supreme Court in 1954, said,
9 PARKER, THE PRINCIPLES OF AEsrHETIcs 14 (1946). "No matter what further purpose artistic expressions may serve, they are produced and valued for themselves ...
Any sort of practical purpose may be one motive in the creation of a work of art,
but its significance is broader than the success or failure of that motive."
10 In Gambart v. Ball, 14 C.B. (N.S.) 306, 143 Eng. Rep. 463, 468 (1863), Chief
Justice Erie observes, "[W]e feel the same degree of pleasure in looking at the forms
and attitudes of the beautiful animals there portrayed whether we see them in the
size in which they are drawn in the original picture, or in the reduced size of the engraving,
or in the still more diminished form in which they appear in the photograph." In
Martin v. Wright, 6 Sim. 297, 58 Eng. Rep. 605, 606 (1833), Sir L. Shadwell notes.
"Then with respect to the Defendant representing his copy as Martin's picture. It must
be either better or worse; if it is better, Martin has the benefit of it; if worse, then the
misrepresentation is only a sort of libel, and this Court will not prevent the publication of a libel."
11 Cf., Dicks v. Brooks, 15 Ch. D. 22, 35 (1880). James, L. J., makes reference to
"the print qua print," but goes on to refer to reputation and commercial value in the
same sentence.
12 Dicks v. Brooks, supra note 11; Gambart v. Ball, supra note 10, 143 Eng. Rep.
at 467.
13 Dicks v. Brooks, supra note 11; Gambart v. Ball, supra note 10 ("Engravings are
things having a commercial value, and the statute gives protection to the money value
of the creation of the artist's mind.") (Emphasis added.); Hanfstaengl v. W. H. Smith
& Sons, [1905] 1 Ch. 519, 525 ("[Nbo alleged copy whether of a picture or of an engraving can properly be held to be a copy within the meaning of the statute and prohibited thereby unless commercial injury can be proved or reasonably presumed.")
14 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); Pellegrini v.
Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
15 Home Art, Inc. v. Glensder Textile Corp., 81 F.Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F.Supp. 729, 732 (M.D. Pa. 1936), final decree
rendered, 24 F.Supp. 393 (M.D. Pa. 1938).
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"Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered."'u
The basic philosophy underlying the decisions was enun7
ciated by District Judge Kickinson in Pellegrini v. Allegrini:'
The beautiful and the development of a love of the beautiful and of
the artistic sense and taste is as much necessary to a well-rounded life as
are the useful things. A like comment applies to our national life. It is
well, therefore, to encourage the production of works of art. The policy
is in line with, and in one sense an extension of, the policy avowed in
our Constitution "to promote the progress of science and useful arts."
Article 1, § 8, cl. 8. These policies, if not the same, are very much alike.

The Substantial Copy Doctrine
Both the English and American cases have applied the
general rule of copyright law to works of art in declaring that
to constitute infringement there must be a copying of a substantial part, 8 or a copy "more or less serville,"' 19 or similar
language.20 What constitutes a substantial copying is always a
question of fact, but the decisions provide some guidance in
making the determination.
It is uniformly held that "slight"'" or "colorable" 2 2 or
"trivial"2 3 variations are inconsequential in the determination
of infringement. The crucial question is whether or not there

16 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
17 Supra, note 14, at 610-11.
18 Springer Lithographing Co. v. Falk, 59 Fed. 707, 712 (2d Cir. 1894), appeal dismissed, 17 Sup. Ct. 998 (1896); M. J. Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 187
F.Supp. 455, 457 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Fleischer Studios, Inc., v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc.,
5 F.Supp. 808, 809 (S.D.N.Y.), affirmed, 73 F.2d 276 (1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717
(1935) (infringement of animated cartoon character); Morrison v. Pettibone, 87 Fed.
330, 332 C.C.N.D. Ill. 1897); Falk v. Donaldson, 57 Fed. 32, 35 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893);
Fishel v. Lueckel, 53 Fed. 499, 500 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892); Falk v. Brett Lithographing
Co., 48 Fed. 678, 679 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891); Brooks v. Religious Tract Society, 45 W.R.
476, 41 Sol. J.o. 333 (1897); Moore v. Clark, 9 M.&W. 692, 152 Eng. Rep. 293 (1842);
Bradbury, Agnew & Co. v. Day, 32 T.L.R. 349 (1916).
19 Alva Studios, Inc. v. 'Winniger, 177 F.Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Pellegrini
v. Allegrini, supra note 14 at 612.
20 Rosenthall v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1953); Contemporary Arts, Inc.
v. F. W. Woohvorth Co., 93 F.Supp. 739, 743 (D.Mass. 1950), affirmed, 193F.2d 162
(1st Cir. 1951), affirmed 344 U.S. 228 (1952) ("[I]t is not necessary that a copy be a
'Chinese copy' in order to find infringement."); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, supra
note 15 ("The test of infringement is whether the defendants have made an original
independent production or a copy of the plaintiff's work.'); Hanfstaengl v. Empire
Palace, [1894] 3 Ch. 109, 130 ("conveying tolerably correct ideas").
21 Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927).
22 Munro v. Smith, 42 Fed. 266, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1890) (differences more than
colorable); West v. Francis, 5 B.&Ald. 737, 106 Eng. Rep. 1361, 1362 (1822).
23 Gross v. Seligman, 212 Fed. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914).
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has been a usurpation of the substantial ideas,2 4 and "it is no
defense that close scrutiny may detect slight differences.2 5 The
fact that the picture is reversed in the copy will not prevent
infringement. .' O
It is not uncommon for an artist to infringe a copyright on
27
a work of his own creation. The case of Gross v. Seligman,
which came before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
1941, involved two photographs made by the same professional
photographer; the first was sold to the plaintiffs with all rights
thereto, the second to the defendants. Both photographs were
of the same nude, though taken two years apart. The two poses
were identical with the exception that in the second "the young
woman now wears a smile and holds a cherry stem between her
teeth,"2 s and "some slight changes in the contour of her figure
are discoverable."2 The court had no difficulty in determining
that the second picture was an infringement of the first. "The
one thing, viz., the exercise of artistic talent, which made the
first photographic picture a subject of copyright, has been used
not to produce another picture, but to duplicate the original."3 0
The same principle would apparently be applicable to paintings.'
Similar Independent Work
Some of the more difficult factual problems arise when the
defendant readily admits that his work is substantially similar
to that of the plaintiff but argues that it was independently
produced-that the similarity is a result of pure coincidence.
Or, an even more common situation, the two artists have used
the same source of inspiration in conceiving their work-perhaps both have made replicas of artistic works in the public
domain. How are these cases to be distinguished from those
discussed above?
24 Springer Lithographing Co. v. Falk, supra note 18; Falk v. Donaldson, supra
note 18 ("Is the sculptor compelled to see his life work in marble appropriated, and
modeled in soap or sugar, because, forsooth, the 'dimples are lacking' from the imitation .');
Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., supra note 18.
25 Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., supra note 21.
20 Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., supra note 18.
27 212 Fed. 930 (2d Cir. 1941).
28 Ibid.
20 Id. at 931.
30 Ibid.
31 Id. at 931 (dictum)
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In the Seligman case,32 the court made clear the point that
if there had in fact been an independent production, the similarity of the pictures would not have made the second an infringement.
Of course when the first picture has been produced and copyrighted
every other artist is entirely free to form his own conception of the Grace
of youth, or anything else, and to avail of the same young woman's services in making it permanent, whether he works with pigments or a camera.
If, by chance, the pose, background, light, and shade, etc., of this new
picture were strikingly similar, and if, by reason of the circumstance that
the same young woman was the prominent feature in both compositions,
it might be very difficult to distinguish the new picture from the old one,
the new would still not be an infringement of the old because it is in no
true sense a copy of the old.33
A more difficult problem confronted a New York district
court in A lva Studios, Inc. v. Winniger 4 In this case, the plain-

tiff had created a minutely detailed reproduction of Rodin's
"Hand of God." The reproduction did not constitute an exact
replica in that the original work had been reduced in size, a

fact which, the plaintiff contended, increased the difficulty of
the work and required "an extremely skilled sculptor" for its
execution. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was mar-

keting products which made use of the artistic work contained
in his reproduction. The defendant argued that his work was
an original interpretation. The court observed that where both
plaintiff and defendant have used an object in the public domain, or any common source, for their work, mere resemblance
will not constitute an infringement.35 In line with the reasoning
in the Seligman case, the court said, "Publication of identical
works cannot be enjoined if it is the result of independent research."3 6 (Emphasis added.) But, at the same time, "the availability to a defendant of other 'common sources' is not a defense
to an action for copyright infringement if the defendant actually
.2 Supra note 27.

Id. at 931.
34 177 F.Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
35 Id. at 267. See also Allegrini v. De Angelis, 59 F.Supp. 248, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1944),
afr'd, 149 F.2d 815 (3rd Cir. 1945), motion for award of atty's fees granted, 68 F.Supp.
684 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 161 F. 2d 184 (3rd Cir. 1947); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F.Supp. 729, 781 (M.D. Pa. 1936); Pellegrini v. Allegrini, supra note 14; Munro
v. Smith, supra note 22; 8 HALSBUY's L. ENG. Copyright 426 (3d ed. 1954).
36 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, supra note 34, at 267. See also AmDuR, CopyRIGHT LAW AND PAcriCE 70 (1936): "[It is possible to have a plurality of valid copyrights directed to closely identical or even identical works. Moreover, none of them,
if independently arrived at will constitute an infringement of the copyright of the
others."
33
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copied the plaintiff's work. ' . 7 The court found that in this case
the evidence supported the argument that the work had in fact
been copied.
It would appear from these cases that whenever the defendant can successfully show that the allegedly infringing object
was an independently created work, the defendant will not be
guilty of piracy, no matter how nearly the works approximate
each other.
At least one case has suggested that where the defendant
has produced both the original and the allegedly infringing
work, the degree of similarity between the two necessary to constitute infringement may depend to some extent on the latitude
of talent possessed by the defendant. In Esquire, Inc. v. Varga
Enterprises,Inc.,3s the plaintiff had hired the defendant to produce for it a number of "girl" paintings.39 The plaintiff claimed
that subsequent to the repudiation of the contract, the defendant caused to be published elsewhere four paintings which were
copied from paintings previously submitted to the plaintiff
which it had copyrighted. The court in its opinion scrupulously
compared each pair of paintings to show the distinctions between them and held that these all were independently created
works. Typical of the comparisons were the following:
Hair-Accused's hair is long and gathered at the base of the neck; Origi-

nal's is combed upward to the top of the head in the well-known "upsweep" coiffure .... Shoulders-due to the different positions of the
muscular effect in the vicinity of the
arms, there is a slightly different
shoulders and upper back.40
Significant to the decision reached by the court is this statement made by District Judge Cambell in defending this rigid
examination of the paintings:
Any attempt to point out the distinguishing elements of the various paintings should be prefaced by the observation that the over one hundred
paintings by defendant in evidence reveal that defendant's artistic talent
is limited to the portrayal of the female figure in varying degrees of undress.... It is apparent from the testimony that this is all he has ever
drawn and seems to be all he ever will draw. It follows, therefore, that
all his future drawings will bear some similarity to his previous work,
268.
3881 F.Supp. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1948), affirmed on this point, 185 F.2d 14 (7th Cir.
1950).
37 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winniger, supra note 34, at

391 d. at 307. ("This particular form of art portrays women in a state of seminudity and emphasizes, or rather over-emphasizes, many of the physical details peculiar
to the female anatomy.")
40 Id. at 308.
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whether 41
or not his past creations are before him at the time he is
painting.

This court, then, is not looking merely at the works of art involved in the litigation.42 What if the purported copies had
not been made by the creator of the original? If they had been
made by a specialist in seascapes, for example, would the court
have held differently? Would distinctions such as those quoted
above have been a substantial variance so as to constitute an
independent work? Obviously, the Esquire opinion suggests
that the decision might have been different, and, at the very
least, the presumption of an independently created painting
would be significantly weakened. This case has not been subsequently cited on this particular point. So far as this writer is
able to determine, similar reasoning has been employed in no
other decision relating to artistic copyrights. If it were to be
followed in the future, it would represent a significant development in copyright law, for it has been a cardinal principle that
the test of infringement is the apparentness of a copying to the
ordinary observer.43 Here a court has suggested that the talents
and abilities of the accused infringer may be a material factor
in determining liability. Needless to say, such qualities are not
readily apparent to the ordinary observer upon examination of
the artistic works.
" The Ordinary Observer"
A considerable amount of recent art criticism has suggested
the idea that many of the masters of fine art "borrowed" portions of their works from previously created works. One Writer
persuasively demonstrates the similarity between a portion of
Rembrandt's etching, Christ Driving Money Changers From
the Temple, and a woodcut by Durer made a century before;
between Gauguin's We Shall Not Go to Market Today and an
ancient Egyptian freize; and even between Picasso's abstract
human figures and drawings made 2700 years ago on the walls
of buildings in what is now Turkey.4 4 A similar comparison has
been made between the abstract work of the contemporary artist
Jackson Pollack and the realistic paintings of Thomas Benton,
under whom the former studied.
41Id. at 307-08.
42 See note 50, infra.
43 See following section.
44
Watson, Borrowing of the Masters, American Artist, Feb. 1960.
4
5Baffling U.S. Arts What It Is About, Life, Nov. 9, 1959, p. 70.
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Though undoubtedly none of the examples cited above
would give rise to a justiciable controversy, they do give rise to
a new area of possible infringement. The courts have held as a
general rule that the mode used in copying is of no consequence
in determining infringement. 46 But what about variations in
style? Would the holder of a copyright in a realistic portrait
painting, for example, have a cause of action against one who had,
using the first painting as his sole inspiration, created an abstract
interpretation of the same subject? Apparently no case has yet
reached the appellate level based on facts such as these, but the
statements made by the courts leave little doubt that the charge
of infringement would not be sustained, barring visible evidence
of a substantial similarity. The courts repeatedly say that the
existence of a substantial copying is to be determined by the
appearance to the "ordinary observer," 47 or the "ordinary rea49
sonable person," 4 or other language connoting the same idea.
The proof of similarity must be found in the works of art themselvesY0 Consistent with this notion, there has been a tendency
to be wary of the use of expert testimony to demonstrate similarities. 51
40 See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
47 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960) (infringement of ornamental cloth design copied from work of art); Fleischer Studies,
Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S.
717 (1935) (Infringement of animated cartoon character); Allegrini v. De Angelis,
supra note 35.
48 Contemporary Arts, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 93 F.Supp. 739, 744 (D. Mass.
1950); Allegrini v. De Angelis, supra note 35.
40 West v. Francis, 5 B. & Aid. 737, 106 Eng. Rep. 1361, 1363 (1882): "A copy is
that which comes so near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea
created by the original."
G0 Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953). In Golding v. R. K. 0.
Pictures, 35 Cal.2d 690, 221 P.2d 95, 101 (1950) (infringement of stage play by motion
picture) the court said: "[D]issection may be necessary to define the existence and extent of a plaintiff's property interest, and on the issue of similarity the test is always
that of the average observer comparing such property interest with the alleged copy
made by the defendant." See also Carman, The Function of the Judge and Jury in the
"Literary Property" Lawsuit, 42 CAL. L. Rnv. 52, 67-69 (1954).
51 Contemporary Arts v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra note 48, at 743-44; Allegrini
v. De Angelis, supra note 35 ("The court must determine whether or not the fact of
infringement is proven, and the opinion of experts, although helpful may not be substituted for the court's judgment."); Falk v. Donaldson, supra note 18; Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., 40 Cal.2d 823, 256 P.2d 933, 940 (1953) (infringement of a common-law copyright in a manuscript by a motion picture) ("[T]he standard of the
ordinary observer should be applied and comparison of the protectible portions should
be made without dissection and without expert or elaborate analysis.") Fox, Evidence
of Plagiarismin the Law of Copyright, 6 U. TORONTO L.J. 414, 452 (1946) ("[I]t may
be said that the courts, while ready to hear the testimony of expert witnesses and to
benefit by the assistance which they give in the way of carefully prepared and critical
analyses and comparisons of the works involved in an action, are rather disposed . . .
to consider themselves more properly the arbiters of originality and plagiarism and to
base their conclusions on their own literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic preceptions.').
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Although the "ordinary observer" test, or "audience" test,
as it is sometimes referred to, is a firmly accepted doctrine of
copyright law, particularly in the area of the fine arts, it is not
without critics. This writer would tend to agree with the proposition that artistic works are not always created for, nor understood by, the "ordinary observer." By comparison, in the area
of patent infringement it would be considered sheer folly to
expect a jury to determine the similarities or differences between two intricate and complex machines on the basis of "ordinary observation." The copying involved in such a situation
very possibly would not be readily apparent to the eye. Can it
be denied that there is more to a work of art than that which
meets the eye? Are there not more subtle ways of pirating the
genius of another than by superficial similarities?
One writer52 has observed,

[T]here can be no dispute that the "spontaneous and immediate" reactions of the ordinary observer are relevant evidence in determining
whether works were copied, but stealing and the immediate impression
of stealing are not the same thing.... [I]t is unlikely that the basic purpose of the Act is merely to protect against the general public's "spontaneous and immediate" impression that these fruits have been stolen....
Ordinary observers may very easily find a literary product enjoyable
and worth paying for without being able to recognize that it is the product of the plaintiff's creative effort and that all the defendant has contributed is a shrewd disguise. 53 [Footnotes omitted.]

It should be noted that in a few cases involving dramatic
property,5 4 and musical property, 5 the courts have been persuaded to rely more heavily upon expert testimony, and occasionally one will find judicial criticism of the general rule.55
To date, however, no cases would appear to have reached the
appellate level in which expert testimony has been seriously
considered regarding works of the fine arts. It would seem that
works of graphic art and sculpture, at least as much as these
other categories, are fields so specialized as to deserve examina52 Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1137 (1952).
53 The context of the article would not indicate that the phrase "a literary
product" was used in the above quotation for the purpose of excluding works of the
fine arts.
54 Shipman v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, Inc. 100 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1938).
55 Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946); Wilkie v. Santly
Bros., Inc., 91 F.2d 978 (2d Gir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. '785 (1987); Arnstein v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 29 F.Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Orth,
The Use of Expert Witnesses in Musical Infringement Cases, 16 U. Prrr. L. REv. 232
(1955).
56 Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, supra note 54, at 536.
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tion and evaluation by experts, and that "on matters that appeal to a more intelligent, artistically aware audience, full resort
to intelligence should be brought to bear on the determination
T
of infringement. 5'
Other FactorsImmaterial in DeterminingInfringement

Numerous other distinguishing features have been held
by the courts as immaterial in determining copyright infringement. Thus, it has been the attitude of the courts that the
artistic merit of the defendant's work, either in itself, or as compared to that of the plaintiff, is of no consequence. 53 It may
even be the case that the defendant's copy is more meritorious
than the original, 59 but still the original creator is to be protected. Justice Holmes, in ruling that a circus poster was a work
of art,60 maintained that the courts were not prepared to consider artistic genius in reaching decisions. "It may be more than
doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the
paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when
seen for the first time.""' It follows that whether or not the
defendant's work is of marketable quality makes no difference
2
as well.
63
Differences which relate merely to size are unimportant.

But what if the alleged copy of the plaintiff's work is of only
part of that work? Again it would appear that infringement
will turn on whether or not there has been a substantial copying.
In Fishel v. Lueckel,64 the court said, "The appropriation of
part of a work is no less an infringement than the appropriation
of the whole, provided 'the alleged infringing part contains any
substantial repetitions of any material parts which are original
and distinctive.' ,,Y5
The fact that the plaintiff's work was incomplete at the
57 Orth, supra note 55, at 260.
58 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., supra note 14; Pellegrini v. Allegrini,
supra note 14; Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 Fed. 136, 137 (C.C.N.D. IL 1907); Allegrini
v. De Angelis, supra note 35; Falk v. Donaldson, supra note 18.
59 Pellegrini v. Allegrini, supra note 14.
0 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1902).
G1 Id. at 251.
62 Fishel v. Lueckel, supra note 18; Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, supra note 20.
03 Falk v. T. P. Howell & Co., 37 Fed. 202 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888); Gambart v. Ball,
supra note 10.
0453 Fed. 499 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892).
051d. at 500. See also Morrison v. Pettibone, supra note 18; London Stereoscopic
& Photographic Co. v. Kelly, 5 T.L.R. 169 (1888).
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time of the alleged copying provides no defense. In Beifeld v.
Dodge Publishing Company,66 the defendant contended that
there was no infringement of the plaintiff's painting because
the copying was of a preliminary sketch which the plaintiff had
made prior to the completion of the painting. The court held
that even if the preliminary drawing had been completed belore
the painting was begun, the copyright on the painting would
protect the sketch as well, and a copying of the sketch would
constitute an infringement. The court reasoned that if the
plaintiff had himself attempted to sell the preliminary sketch
after selling the painting, such a sale would infringe the copyright on the painting. Thus, it concluded, in legal contemplation, the two works are the same.
The Mode of Copying
The methods used in duplicating the works of art involved
in infringement cases have been varied, and often ingenious.
Generally, the cases have held that the mode employed in copying is immaterial."'
One of the earliest problems to confront the English courts
was the so-called tableau vivant, or "living picture." This innovation involved the arrangement of human beings and scenery
in such a manner as to duplicate the image produced by the
plaintiff's picture. In an early case,68 the chancery court ruled
that such a representation did not constitute an infringement
of the plaintiff's copyright. But following the passage of the
Copyright Act of 1911,69 the problem was again brought before
66 198 Fed. 658 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911). See also Fishel v. Lueckel, supra note 64.
67 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); M. J.
Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 137 F.Supp. 455 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Jones Bros.
Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F.Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936); Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 Fed.
136 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1907); Werckmeister v. Pierce & Bushnell Mfr. Co., 63 Fed. 445
(C.C.D. Mass. 1894), rev'd on other grounds, 72 Fed. 54 (1st Cir. 1896); Falk v. Donaldson, 57 Fed. 32 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893); Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., 48 Fed. 678
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891); Falk v. T. P. Howell & Co., 37 Fed. 202 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888);
Schumacher v. Schwencke, 30 Fed 690 (C.S.S.D.N.Y. 1887); Rossiter v. Hall, 20 Fed.
Cas. 1253 (No. 12082) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1866); Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. Rep. 121
(1859); Frost & Reed v. Olive Series Publishing Co., 24 T.L.R. 649 (1908); Bradbury,
Agnew & Co. v. Day, supra note 18; Ex parte Beal [1868], L.R. 3 Q.B. 387; 4 Enc. Law
Scot. 504 (1933). In Gambart v. Ball, 14 C.B. (N.S.) 306, 143 Eng. Rep. 463 (1863), the
defendant contended that a photograph could not infringe an engraving since the art
of photography was not known at the time the copyright act was passed. In holding
for the plaintiff, Chief Justice Erle said, "I see no reason why these very wide and
general words should not be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning,
and be held to apply to any mode of copying known at that time and to such other
modes of multiplying copies as the ingenuity of man may from time to time discover."
68 Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, Ltd., [1894] 3 Ch. 109.
69 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (1911).
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the court, 70 and the living picture was held to be an infringement. 71 Much earlier, in 1859, an Irish court had held that

where the defendant had arranged a "living picture" and photographed it, the photograph constituted an infringement of the
plaintiff's copyright.72
Other more conventional forms of copying have generally
afforded no difficulty. A water color painting may be infringed
by an oil, or a crayon, or a lithographic facsimile. 73 A lithograph
may infringe a copyrighted photograph. 74 A photograph may be
an infringement of a piece of statuary, 75 or an engraving.76 And
a photograph which combines the plaintiff's photograph and an
independently made drawing may infringe the original photograph.7 7 Finally, in Falk v. T. P. Howell & Company, s a New
York district court held that the plaintiff's photograph would
be infringed when the defendant stamped a raised figure, like
the picture, on the leather out of which he made the bottoms
and backs of chairs. And the same court, sixty years later, held
a scarf design to infringe the copyright on an oil painting reproduction.

79

Copy of a Copy
To this point consideration has only been given to those
situations in which the defendant was accused of copying the
original work of art. Additional problems arise in those cases
in which there is a dispute as to whether the alleged infringing
copy was based upon the original or upon a reproduction.
It is germane to this discussion to note a feature which
distinguishes artistic work from other forms of creative endeavor. The copyright on such works, with the exception of
Bradbury, Agnew 9- Co. v. Day, supra note 18.
Ibid. Justice Coleridge, speaking for the court, said, "Before 1911 the law protected the design, which meant the particular form in which the idea was embodied,
and since 1911 the law has protected that embodiment, whatever be the medium in
which it was expressed . . . if the embodiment of the idea or any substantial part of
it was copied, copyright was infringed."
72 Turner v. Robinson, supra note 67.
73 Schumacher v. Schwencke, supra note 67, at 691 (dictum).
74 Falk v. Donaldson, supra note 67; Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., supra
note 66.
75 Bracken v. Rosenthal, supra note 67; M. J. Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh Brewing
Co., supra note 67.
76 Rossiter v. Hall, supra note 67; M. J. Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co.,
supra note 67; Gambart v. Ball, supra note 67.
77 Lumiere v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 275 Fed. 428 (2d Cir. 1921).
78 37 Fed. 202 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
70 Home Art, Inc. v. Glensder Textile Corp., supra note 15
70
71
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photographs, attaches to their physical embodiment., ° That is
to say, the copyright of a painting provides protection for certain bits of pigment applied with certain brush strokes on a
particular canvas. The copyright of a statuary is related to a
given piece of granite, etc. By contrast, when a literary work is
copyrighted, a precise copy may be made of the protected words
-by typing, by writing in longhand, by any method whatever,
and, for that matter, in any language. The fact that the infringing work does not physically look like the original is immaterial.
In the same fashion, what is protected by a musical copyright is
not the sheets of paper inscribed with symbols; it is the melody
represented by those symbols. Any accurate copying will produce the same combination of sounds when played by an accomplished musician.
Such is not the case with works of art. It would not be inaccurate to say that it is actually impossible to make a true copy
of a copyrighted painting or work of sculpture. Only approximations of the original can be made, a fact which has been
dramatically brought home to any person of normal perception
who has had the opportunity of comparing only a few paintings
with their reproductions.
It is because of this that it has long been recognized that
the making of reproductions of art is an art in itself."' In Alfred
&'Co. vs. CataldaFine Arts, Inc.,)" District Judge Smith said:
Of course, the ideas for the subject are entirely those of the first artist, the painter. What is original with the engraver is the handling of
the painting in another medium to bring out the engraver's conception
of the total effect of the old master. The engraver is not trying to alter
or improve on the old master. He is trying to express in another medium
what the original artist expressed in oils on canvas.
In implementing the protection provided for reproductions
by the Copyright Act, 3 the Copyright Office has described the
category as follows: 4 Reproductions of works of art (Class H).
This class includes published reproductions of existing works of art in
the same or a different medium, such as lithograph, photoengraving,
etching or drawing of a painting, sculpture, or other work of art.
80 Cf., 47 L. Q. REv. 332 (1931).
81 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1951);
Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F.Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
8274 F.Supp. 973, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), modified, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
83

17 U.S.C.

8437 C.F.R.

§ 5 (h) (1958).

§ 202.11

(1960).
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Thus the unique situation arises in the area of artistic copyright
that the same work of art may be the subject of two or even
more copyrights.
In an 1873 case, Schumacher v. Schwencke, s5 the plaintiff
held a copyright on an original painting. The plaintiff made
lithographic copies of the painting, which were not in themselves copyrighted. The defendant made copies of the plaintiff's
work, from the lithographic copies. The defendant contended,
and apparently it was not challenged by the plaintiff, that he
had in fact never even seen the original work of art. The court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, saying:
It by no means follows from the fact that the law recognizes a distinction
between a painting and a print that a copyright for the former will not
protect its owner in the sale of copies thereof, even though they may appropriately be called prints. It is clear that the defendants are wrongdoers. They have invaded the complainants' territory. They have copied
the painting. It is immaterial how this was accomplished, whether directly or indirectly. They have copied a lithograph which was protected

by the complainants' copyright, and have thus attempted unlawfully,
and without due recompense, to reap the fruits of the complainants'
genius and enterprise.80
Thirty years later, in Champney v. Haag,87 the plaintiff's
copyrighted painting had been reproduced by a copyrighted
photograph. This action was brought for an infringement of
the copyright in the painting. Upon the trial of the case, the
evidence showed that the defendant's copies were made from the
photograph and not from the painting. The court held that
there was an infringement of the copyright on the photograph
but not on the painting. It said that the plaintiff would have
to show that the illustrations in question were not copied from
the photograph, a requirement which he failed to meet.
It is possible to reconcile these two decisions on the basis
that in the Schumacher case there was but a single copyrightthat on the original work; in the Champney case, both the original and the reproduction had been copyrighted. But consider
ing the vociferous language used in the Schumacher opinion in
guaranteeing the original work an absolute protection from infringement, it would appear more likely that that court would
not have agreed with the Champney decision and would have
85 30 Fed. 690 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
s6 Id. at 691-92.
87 121 Fed. 944 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903).
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held the defendant to have infringed the protection afforded
for both the original painting and the photograph.
A New York district court followed the reasoning of the
Champney case (though not referring to it) in a recent case ss
in which the opposite situation was presented. The plaintiff
was the owner of a copyrighted reproduction, and the defendant
contended that his copy constituted no infringement, because
he had copied the original oil painting. Though the ruling was
for the plaintiff, the court indicated that the defendant would
not have been liable if the evidence had supported his contention.
The rule is clearly sound in this latter decision. It could
hardly be denied that when a third party makes a reproduction
of an original work he has not infringed the copyright on another reproduction. He has not utilized the talents of the first
reproducer. But in the original situation, where the third party
copies the reproduction, it would appear likewise clear that the
injury done extends beyond the reproduction to the original
work. "The concept of beauty expressed in the materials of
statuary or drawing, is the thing which is copyrighted."8 9 The
aesthetic value to be found in the reproduction is in large part
contingent upon the artistic genius of the creator of the work.
The Schumacher and Champney cases were both decided
prior to the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909. This act required, inter alia, that a copyrighted work of art or reproduction
carry notice of copyright," a requirement which had been present in the previous act,91 but contained a new provision that

where the copyright proprietor had omitted the notice by accident or mistake the act would "prevent the recovery of damages against an innocent infringer who has been misled by the
omission of the notice." 92 If notice were intentionally omitted,
the copyright would be forfeited.9 3 The problem of notice did
not confront the court in the previously discussed cases, but
with this enactment, it became a determination precedent to
the question of copying.
88 Home Art, Inc. v. Glensder Textile Corp., supra note 79.

89 Cases cited note 15 supra.
90 Act March 4, 1909, ch. 320 § 18, 35 Stat. 1079.
91 Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301 § 1, 18 Stat. 79.
92 Act March 4, 1909 ch. 320 § 20, 35 Stat. 1080.
93 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weinger Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
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In Leigh v. Barnhart,%a photograph of the plaintiff's oil
painting appeared in a magazine, but the magazine inadvertently failed to identify it as copyrighted. The plaintiff did not hold
a copyright on the reproductionY95 The defendants had made
copies of the reproduction in the magazine. The court denied
relief to the plaintiff as there was no notice given to the defendants of the copyright. This is the only case decided since the
passage of the Copyright Act of 1907 that the present writer has
been able to uncover in which the holder of the copyright on an
original work of art has brought an action for infringement
against one who has copied from a reproduction in which the
plaintiff did not hold the copyright. The court strongly implies
here that if there had been a compliance with the statutory requirement of notice, the plaintiff would have been entitled to
relief, as would the holder of the copyright on the reproduction.
Conclusion
The number of cases involving infringement of works of
the fine arts to come before the appellate courts has been relatively small, a fact which has no doubt impeded the development of the law in this area to some extent. The lack of controversies may be attributed to a number of reasons. Works of
art are normally not channeled through publishing outlets in
the same manner as are literary and musical compositions. As
a result, many artists receive little guidance in the marketing of
their material and thus are virtually unaware of their legal
rights so far as their creations are concerned. Furthermore,
piracy is not so common in this area as in others because of the
manifest difficulties entailed in copying. In many instances it
would take another artist to substantially copy a work of art.
Finally, the factual requirements for proving an infringement
would appear at times quite difficult to fulfill, especially in cases
of like reproductions of works in the public domain.
At present, the great weight of authority would confine the
determination of infringement to a comparison of the works of
art involved in the controversy. In suggesting that the court
should go beyond the paintings themselves and that the defend94 96 F.Supp. 194 (D.NJ. 1951).
01 Plaintiff contended that the magazine had assigned the copyright in the reproduction to him, but the court found that it had only unsuccessfully attempted to
reconvey the copyright in the original, which in fact the plaintiff had never given up.
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ant's artistic talent should be taken in account, the Esquire decision is quite obviously not in line with the prevailing attitude.
Due to the particular facts there involved, the defendant's abilities would appear quite relevant to a fair disposal of the case.
But to extend the principle beyond this narrowly defined fact
situation would be exceedingly dangerous. Virtually every proficient artist's works are stylistically similar to some extent, at
least enough that his works can be recognized as his. Should the
courts examine all of an artist's work in order to find out if there
is a substantial similarity between two of those works? Or is the
fact that "girl" paintings are aesthetically inferior, or easily produced, or not of lasting value, important? Any of these approaches would go against the grain of recognized copyright law
and plunge the courts into the area of artistic value determinations, an area which they have systematically avoided in infringement cases in the past.
The more difficult problems confronted in all infringement cases are factual, 96 and it would at least appear questionable that the standards applied by the courts are completely
satisfactory. The adoption of the familiar "reasonable man"
legal standard in the guise of the "ordinary observer" would not
seem in all cases equal to the task of determining piracy. One
United States district judge has said that the best the judges can
do in cases of this nature is to "seek to approximate the median
impression. '9 7 The present writer would suggest that though
the impression of the "ordinary observer" is an important consideration, to limit the proof of infringement this narrowly
would be in effect to sanction many real but subtle methods of
piracy. It is hoped that in the area of the fine arts we shall see
an increasing reliance upon expert witnesses in the future. In
this respect, the artistic works decisions would not appear to
have kept pace with other types of copyright infringement.
If, as Justice Reed has said, "Sacrificial days devoted to such
creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered, 98 it would certainly seem that any piracy should
be prevented, whether visible to the "ordinary observer" or not.
Concomitantly, where the defendant has substantially copied a
96 Yankwich, Legal Protection of Ideas-A Judge's Approacfh, 43 VA. L. REv. 375,
379 (1957).
97 Ibid.
98 Mazer v. Stein, supra note 16, at 219.
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reproduction of the plaintiff's work, the artistic ability which
the plaintiff has embodied in the work has been wrongfully
used, and the plaintiff should be allowed redress, regardless of
whether or not he holds a copyright on the reproduction.
Joseph G. Cook

